

# RETHINKING STRATEGIC VOTING

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## About the Talk:

Strategic voting is classically defined as voting for one's second preferred option to prevent one's least preferred option from winning when one's first preference has no chance. This definition explicitly focuses on a single race with at least three candidates and a single winner, a common scenario in electoral systems that have single-member districts with plurality electoral rules and multiparty systems. Indeed, the majority of work on strategic voting considers elections in Canada and the United Kingdom, but a growing literature demonstrates that strategic voting occurs under different types of electoral rules, including proportional representation, and that the direct outcome of a single race is not the only motivation for voters. Thus, a broader and more nuanced understanding of strategic voting across multiple institutional contexts is required. Drawing upon a chapter with John Aldrich and André Blais from our recent book, I will outline a

conceptual framework for understanding voting behaviour by considering how preferences and expectations interact to produce sincere and strategic choices across a variety of institutional contexts.

## DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

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**Date:** Friday, January 25, 2019  
**Time:** 10:00 – 11:30 am  
**Place:** Social Science Rm 729  
**ALL WELCOME !**